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THE “PRINCIPAL PURPOSE” DRIVEN
LIFE: HOW HOSPITALS SHOULD
APPLY ERISA’S CHURCH PLAN
EXEMPTION AFTER ADVOCATE V.
STAPLETON
VIRGINIA L. BROWN, B.B.A., J.D.
“KNOWING YOUR PURPOSE GIVES MEANING TO YOUR LIFE.”1
INTRODUCTION
The United States’ health care industry is filled with numerous protections
for individuals and entities who have objections based on religious beliefs and
moral convictions. 2 For example, there is a long history of conscience
protections for individuals that object to performing or assisting in the
performance of abortion or sterilization procedures3 or assisted suicide
(including euthanasia or mercy killing).4 Over time, as more medical entities
declare affiliation with religious entities, Congress has expanded conscience
protections to cover more than just the daily activities of medical professionals.
Generally, churches have to comply with the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA or the Act) just like any other employer. Yet, Congress
provided an exception from ERISA for the administration of “church plans.”5
This exemption has existed for many years without issue until recently, when
this exemption became the subject of increased litigation. ERISA defines
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1. Rick Warren, THE PURPOSE DRIVEN LIFE: WHAT ON EARTH AM I HERE FOR? (2002).
2. Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under
the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792, 47,792 (Oct. 13, 2017).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 et eq. (collectively known as the “Church Amendments”); 42 U.S.C. § 238n;
Weldon Amendment, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 11-117, 123 Stat 3034.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 18113.
5. 26 U.S.C. § 414(e)(1) (2018).
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“church plan”6 to apply more broadly than merely to plans covering people who
work in houses of worship; schools, nursing homes, and hospitals may also
comply if they are controlled or owned by religious entities.7 Most recently,
questions have risen regarding whether the employee pension plans used by
religiously-affiliated hospitals have been correctly classified as “church plans”
exempt from ERISA.8 The answers to these questions carry with it large
consequences because qualified church plans are excused from certain coverage,
vesting, benefit accrual, and funding requirements of ERISA and the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC) that otherwise apply to tax-qualified plans.9
In the 2017 landmark case Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, one
question that had long been debated between circuit courts regarding the extent
of this exemption was resolved; the Court determined that a plan established and
maintained by a church includes a plan maintained by a principal purpose
organization.10 This ruling means that any religiously-controlled entity that
manages an employee benefit plan no longer must be created by a religious entity
in order to qualify for this exemption. Regardless of how (and by whom) the
entity was first established, an organization may still take advantage of this
exemption from ERISA as long as the entity is maintained by a principal purpose
organization.
This Supreme Court ruling is far from a full resolution of the issue.
Advocate left a few issues unresolved, such as the definition of “principle
purpose organization.” This leaves religiously-affiliated hospitals in a sticky
place: unsure if they qualify for—and therefore can rely on—the ERISA church
exemption. Since there are many potentially devastating effects on nonqualifying hospitals that mistakenly relied on this exemption, it is important for
the qualifying factors to be clear. No longer should religiously-affiliated
hospitals seek and rely on non-binding (and sometimes inaccurate) private letter
rulings (PLRs) issued by the IRS in order to determine their exemption status.
In Part I, this Comment will discuss ERISA’s church plan exemption preand post-Advocate. Additionally, it will cover a brief overview of the history of
employee benefit plans in the healthcare system and describe the roles of
different governmental entities. In Part II, this Comment will discuss the
landmark case Advocate v. Stapleton and its impact on the employee benefit
industry, and the current status of ERISA’s principal purpose requirement. Last,
6. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 3(33)(A), 88 Stat. 829,
838 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2018)). This definition of church plan is a mirror image of
the definition of church plan set out in § 414(e) as amended by ERISA. 26 U.S.C. § 414(e)(2).
7. 26 U.S.C. § 414(e)(2); Emily Morrison, Revisiting ERISA’s Church Plan Exemption After
Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1281–82 (2017).
8. Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017).
9. 26 U.S.C. § 414(e)(2); See also Morrison, supra note 7, at 1281–82 (examining the legislative
history of the church plan exemption and case law development that impacts the exemption).
10. Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017).
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Part III will suggest a new set of factors that each religiously-controlled hospital
and its employee benefit subcommittees can rely on in determining if it meets
the “principal purpose” requirement.
PART I: ERISA’S CHURCH PLAN EXEMPTION
A. Timeline of Significant Healthcare and ERISA Events
Congress has consistently expanded healthcare law over time—especially
as it relates to employee benefits—to protect the average American.11 Courts
have been more willing to protect against various forms of discrimination when
it relates to the blanket application of healthcare, as seen in the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 and the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996.12 There have also been many
significant milestones throughout the history of ERISA in the healthcare
industry. Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 for the purpose of setting minimum
standards for most voluntarily-established private retirement plans and health
plans.13 Shortly after the adoption of this Act, the IRS held that the church plan
exemption did not extend to hospitals established by an order of Catholic nuns
because the hospitals did not include “religious functions.”14 Congress responded
with an amendment in 1980 to broaden the exemption to its present state.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 permitted limitations on
the amount of benefits provided and prohibited employers from excluding
employees from retirement plans when they are hired within five years of normal
retirement age. In 1986, the Tax Reform Act further tightened the
nondiscrimination requirements for retirement plans. The Family Medical Leave
Act (FMLA) of 1993 brought more big changes to the field of employment
regulations; it generally provided covered employees the right to take an unpaid
leave of absence from work for medical or family obligations without
jeopardizing their employment. While an employee is on FMLA leave, the
employer must maintain the employee’s group health plan coverage. Another big
change to the field of medicine came in 1996 when Congress enacted the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).15 This act amended
11. PRACTICAL LAW EMP. BENEFITS & EXEC. COMP., SIGNIFICANT EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE ENACTMENT OF ERISA TIMELINE, PRACTICAL LAW CHECKLIST 1-577-3228,
Westlaw.
12. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1151 100 Stat. 2085, 2494–09; Mental Health
Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, §§ 701–703, 110 Stat. 2874, 2944–50.
13. History
of
EBSA
and
ERISA,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
LAB.,
available
at
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/history-of-ebsa-and-erisa (last visited July 12,
2019).
14. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,266, 1977 WL 46200, *5-6 (Sept. 22, 1977).
15. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936
(“[T]o improve portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and individual
markets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care delivery, to promote the
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ERISA to provide increased health plan portability of coverage by limiting
preexisting condition exclusions and to prohibit discrimination against
participants and beneficiaries based on their health status. Also, this act required
any entities covered by HIPAA to implement safeguards to protect the security
of health insurance information in electronic form.
More significant changes came in 2010 with the enactment of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).16 This act added the employer
mandate, which penalizes employers for failing to offer its employees health
coverage (or to offer inadequate coverage). In 2012, the Supreme Court held that
the PPACA’s individual mandate was a constitutional exercise of Congress’
power to tax.17 Yet, Congress effectively eliminated this individual mandate as
part of sweeping tax reform legislation by reducing the penalty to $0, effective
in 2019.18 In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, the Court found that the PPACA’s
contraception coverage mandate—part of the law’s preventative services rules—
violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as applied to for-profit
closely-held corporations with religious objective to the contraceptives
mandate.19
B. Purpose and Enactment of ERISA
ERISA was enacted, in part, to provide stronger protection and security for
the pensions of American workers should their current or former employers
unexpectedly go out of business and drain any funds previously promised for
pensions.20 ERISA imposes extensive requirements on private retirement and
welfare plans, such as reporting, disclosure, vesting, benefit accrual, and funding
requirements.21
Congress provided some exceptions within ERISA—the most relevant here
is the church plan exception22—which exempts churches from many of ERISA’s
standards. In providing this exemption, Congress intended to avoid government
entanglement with church business.23 Some experts have speculated that this

use of medical savings accounts, to improve access to long-term care services and coverage, to simplify
the administration of health insurance, and for other purposes.”).
16. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001 et seq. (2018)).
17. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012).
18. See generally Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054, 2054-2238 (2017).
19. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014).
20. History of EBSA and ERISA, U.S. DEP’T. OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/aboutebsa/about-us/history-of-ebsa-and-erisa (last visited July 12, 2019).
21. Morrison, supra note 7, at 1284 (citing Colleen E. Medill, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 31–32 (4th ed. 2015)).
22. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 4(b)(2), 88 Stat. 829,
839–40 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2) (2018)).
23. Morrison, supra note 7, at 1287
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exemption was provided based on Congress’s “belief that churches have a
particularly strong moral commitment to their employees and are likely to keep
the pension promises they make to their employees.”24 By providing this
exemption, Congress allowed churches to create and manage their own plans for
their employees’ retirement. In the long run, this exemption may save churches
lots of money and allow them to better allocate their tithed income to their
charitable purpose. Congress has also extended this exemption to other
religiously-affiliated organizations, such as hospitals and schools, under the
belief that they shared a similar moral commitment to their employees.
On one hand, exempting plans from ERISA are risky because it puts
employees in a potentially catastrophic position if their career-long contributions
to a pension becomes insolvent by their retirement date.25 On the other hand,
exemption is beneficial because compliance with ERISA is expensive, which
adds yet another cost to the already increasing price of healthcare.26
Issues arise when an organization is not sure whether it qualifies for the
church exemption. If church leaders assume they are exempt and operate their
retirement plans outside the umbrella of ERISA, there is a risk that they later
discover they are not exempt and are immediately responsible for back payment
of taxes and penalties. Because there is no clear standard, each entity must seek
individual guidance from the IRS or Department of Labor (DOL) regarding
whether they are exempt.
Yet, even if church-affiliated organizations obtain qualification
confirmation for the church plan exemption, the fight over pension plan
administration will simply shift to the state courts.27 This is not ideal because
many states do not have specific statutes analogous to ERISA; rather, the
governing law will be based on the states’ common law of trusts, fiduciary duties,
and contracts.28 Church-affiliated organizations that operate across state borders
will potentially have to determine and comply with multiple sets of legal
obligations that vary by state.29 Therefore, an exemption from ERISA does not

24. Norman Stein, An Article of Faith: The Gratuity Theory of Pensions and Faux Church Plans,
A.B.A
EMP.
BENEFITS
COMM.
NEWSL.
(Summer
2014),
http://web.archive.org/web/20180109033327/http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/groups/lab
or_law/ebc_newsletter/14_sum_ebc_news/faith.html.
25. Ronald Mann, Opinion analysis: Justices unanimously uphold ERISA exemption for churchaffiliated
pension
plans, SCOTUS
BLOG (June
5,
2017,
3:47
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/opinion-analysis-justices-unanimously-uphold-erisa-exemptionchurch-affiliated-pension-plans/.
26. Id.
27. Joanne C. Youn & Robert G. Cluett, Church-Affiliated Organizations Face New Challenges After
Advocate, 29 TAX’N EXEMPTS 26, 28 (2017) (discussing church-affiliated organizations’ best options for
determining their exemption status under ERISA).
28. Id. at 29.
29. Id.
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guarantee that pension plans will impose fewer obligations on their
participants.30
C. The Role of the IRS
The IRS bears much of the responsibility for overseeing church pension
plans and its interpretation and application of the church plan definition has
remained relatively consistent over time.31 The IRS disseminates its
interpretation of this statute primarily through the issuance of private letter
rulings (PLRs), which are determinations issued to specific taxpayers upon
request.32 Every organization can request a PLR that will indicate whether it is
eligible for the exemption, however, these PLRs only bind the requesting party.
Over the years, religiously-affiliated entities have relied on obtaining these
individual PLRs in order to operate their plans as ERISA-exempt church plans.33
This is not ideal, though, because it takes lots of money and time to acquire these
rulings, which may only be a realistic option for larger and more powerful
entities.34 While a church may take advantage of the ERISA exemption without
a PLR from the IRS, most hospitals and other religiously-affiliated entities still
regularly request PLRs to offer confirmation of their plans’ status for tax
purposes.35 A PLR is basically useless to other non-requesting organizations
because it is applicable only to the specific taxpayer to whom it is issued and
may not be used or cited as precedent.36 Additionally, a PLR has no binding
effect on any court that may later consider the exempt status of an organization.37
Therefore, reliance on PLRs is far from an ideal situation.
D. The Role of the Department of Labor
The Department of Labor (DOL) is another federal agency that administers
and enforces ERISA. DOL has not issued either a regulation or interpretation
concerning what constitutes a church plan. To date, the DOL has only issued an
information release that indicates they are awaiting further development of the

30. Id.
31. Jeffrey A. Herman, Resolving ERISA’s “Church Plan” Problem, 31 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 231,
251 (2016).
32. Morrison, supra note 7, at 1284.
33. Id.
34. User fees for PLRs range from $250 to $50,000. Rev. Proc. 2018-1, Section 15. When only one
branch of the IRS is involved, a ruling can take two to three months. When the issue is more complex and
more branches are involved, a ruling can take over three months.
35. Morrison, supra note 7, at 1284.
36. Id. at 1291.
37. Understanding IRS Guidance – A Brief Primer, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (July 6, 2016)
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/understanding-irs-guidance-a-brief-primer.
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IRS regulations prior to issuing any of their own regulations.38 They have,
however, issued some Advisory Opinions under ERISA Procedure 76-1 that
provide interpretative guidance for § 3(33) of ERISA as it relates to certain
employee benefit arrangements.39
E. Defining “Church Plan”
To be exempt from taxation under I.R.C. § 501, an employer need not be a
church to sponsor a church plan as long as the plan of the employer is established
and maintained by an organization that is controlled by or associated with a
church or convention or association of churches.40 Typically, a religious hospital
will establish a subcommittee whose sole duty is to manage the benefit plans. An
organization is “controlled” by a church if the majority of its officers or directors
are appointed by the church’s governing board or by officials of the church.41 An
organization is “associated with” a church or by a convention or association of
churches if it shares common religious bonds and convictions with the church.42
In 1974, Congress originally defined a church plan as one “established and
maintained for its employees by a church or by a convention or association of
churches.”43 After the 1980 ERISA amendment, Subsection A of the statute now
reads:
The term ‘church plan’ means a plan established and maintained (to
the extent required in clause (ii) of subparagraph (B)) for its
employees (or their beneficiaries) by a church or by a convention or
association of churches which is exempt from tax under section 501
of title 26.44
The current Subsection C (an expansion of the church plan definition under
Subsection A) has remained the same since 1980; it reads:
A plan established and maintained for its employees (or their
beneficiaries) by a church or by a convention or association of
churches includes a plan maintained by an organization, whether a
civil law corporation or otherwise, the principal purpose or function
of which is the administration or funding of a plan or program for the
38. Gail Jones, Government and Single-Employer Collectively Bargained Plans, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV. TAX EXEMPT & GOV’T ENTITIES 4-10, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/epchd403.pdf
(last visited July. 31, 2019).
39. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Advisory Opinion 2004-11A (Dec. 30, 2004).
40. Daniel J. Schwartz, Employee Benefits for Tax-Exempt Organizations (Portfolio 487),
BLOOMBERG TAX, https://www.bna.com/employee-benefits-taxexempt-p73014475830/ (last visited Apr.
7, 2019).
41. 26 U.S.C. § 414(e)(3)(A) (2018).
42. Id. § 414(e)(3)(D).
43. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 3(33)(A), 88 Stat. 829,
838 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2018)).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(A) (2018); 26 U.S.C. § 414 (e)(1) (2018) (providing a parallel citation in
the Tax Code).
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provision of retirement benefits or welfare benefits, or both, for
the employees of a church or a convention or association of churches,
if such organization is controlled by or associated with a church or a
convention or association of churches.45
In summary, a “church plan” established and maintained by a church
includes a plan maintained by a principal purpose organization.46 Some big
issues that remain are the meaning of the terms “established and maintained” and
“includes,” and the interaction of Subsection C and Subsection A of the statute.
Yet, this Comment will not address those issues. It is unclear when an
organization is considered to be a principal purpose organization, such as under
what circumstances the administration of an employee benefit plan is the
organization’s principal purpose.47
If an organization qualifies for an ERISA exemption, it still has the option
to use or ignore that exemption; when deciding what direction to go, entities must
weigh the benefits and burdens of aligning their retirement plan to ERISA’s
standards. There are two types of church plans: non-electing church plans and
electing church plans.48 If a church qualifies for the ERISA exemption and
chooses to take advantage of it, the default rule applies and it is designated a nonelecting church plan. In such a case, non-electing church plans do not have to
meet the funding, vesting, reporting, and disclosure requirements under ERISA.
However, these plans will remain subject to the Tax Code’s qualified plan
provisions that preexisted ERISA.49 Sometimes, though, a church may qualify
for the ERISA exemption but choose not to use it. These so-called electing
church plans qualify for church plan status, but nonetheless opt into ERISA under
Section 410(d) of the Tax Code.50 Once made, an election is irrevocable.
F. Circuit Splits Leading Up to the Supreme Court’s 2017 Decision
Today, it is still unclear how the two subsections of ERISA § 33 relate to
one another because federal courts across the United States have failed to apply
Subsections C and A in a uniform manner.51 The Third, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits have affirmed rulings that interpreted the exemptions narrowly, finding
that the two subsections dictate that the religiously-affiliated hospital systems’
pension plans do not qualify as church plans because they were not established

45. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(C)(i) (emphasis added).
46. Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652, 1663 (2017).
47. See id. at 1657 n.2 (noting that the court’s opinion is not addressing the issue of whether the
hospital’s internal benefits committees are principal purpose organizations under ERISA).
48. Morrison, supra note 7, at 1288.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 1297 (citing Jeffrey A. Herman, Resolving ERISA’s “Church Plans” Problem, 31
A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 231, 232 (2016)).
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by a church.52 In contrast, other district courts have embraced a broader
interpretation, finding that “church plans do not have to be established by
churches as long as the plans are properly maintained by a church-affiliated
organization.”53
The leading case in the Third Circuit is Kaplan v. Saint Peter’s Healthcare
System.54 This case involved a suit filed by current and former employees of St.
Peter’s Healthcare System, which operated St. Peter’s University Hospital and
other companies (St. Peter’s).55 St. Peter’s established its defined benefit pension
plan in 1974 and operated it as an ERISA plan for more than thirty years before
reconsidering its plan’s status and seeking a church plan PLR in 2006.56 The
district court held that St. Peter’s pension plan was not a church plan because the
plain language of the statute requires that a “church plan must, from the outset,
be established by a church and can be maintained by an organization controlled
by or associated with a church.”57 The district court declined to give deference
to the PLR that St. Peter’s had received from the IRS and the Third Circuit
affirmed.58
The Seventh Circuit’s leading case on the issue is Stapleton v. Advocate
Health Care Network.59 In this case, former and current employees filed a claim
against the Advocate hospital system, which operates twelve hospitals across
Illinois and employs more than 33,000 employees.60 Advocate was formed in
1995 through the merger of two hospital systems, the Lutheran General Health
System and the Evangelical Health Systems.61 The district court held that the
52. See Stapleton v. Advocate Health Care Network, 817 F.3d 517, 523 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that
because the plan “was both established and maintained by a church-affiliated organization, it is not a
church plan”), rev’d, Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017); Rollins v.
Dignity Health, 830 F.3d 900, 905 (9th Cir. 2016) (“In order to qualify for the church-plan exemption
under subparagraph (C)(i), a plan must have been established by a church and maintained either by a
church or by a principal-purpose organization”), rev’d, Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137
S. Ct. 1652 (2017); Kaplan v. St. Peter’s Healthcare System, 810 F.3d 175, 181 (3rd Cir. 2015) (“Here,
Congress carefully limited the church plan exemption to only those plans established by a church”), rev’d,
Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017).
53. See Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 147 F. Supp. 3d 1191 (D. Colo. 2015) (finding the
church plan was maintained and administered by a church subcommittee); Overall v. Ascension, 23 F.
Supp. 3d 816 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (reading the statutory church plan exemption as not requiring
establishment by a church to maintain church plan designation).
54. 810 F.3d 175 (2015), rev’d, Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017).
55. Id. at 178.
56. Id. at 177–78.
57. Kaplan v. Saint Peter’s Healthcare Sys., No. 13–2941 (MAS)(TJB), 2014 WL 1284854, at *6
(D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2014) (emphasis added), aff’d, Kaplan v. Saint Peter’s Healthcare Sys., 810 F.3d 175
(3rd Cir. 2015), and rev’d, Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017).
58. Kaplan, 810 F.3d at 178.
59. Stapleton v. Advocate Health Care Network, 817 F.3d 517 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d, Advocate
Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017).
60. Id. at 520.
61. Id. at 520–21.
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pension plan failed to meet the criteria for a church plan exemption solely
because it was maintained by a non-church entity.62 The Seventh Circuit
affirmed, echoing the Third Circuit’s logic. Notably, when the Supreme Court
reversed, it expressly stated that “nothing we say in this opinion expresses a view
of . . . [whether] the hospitals’ pension plans are not ‘church plans’ because the
hospitals do not have the needed association with a church.”63
Lastly, the most influential case on this instant issue is Rollins v. Dignity
Health in which the Ninth Circuit examined Dignity Health, a medical facility
formed through a merger of two religiously-affiliated health systems.64 The
district court found that the plan was not subject to church plan exemption
because it was not “established” by a church.65 The Ninth Circuit affirmed.66
These varying results on similar issues provided a rocky foundation leading
up to the Supreme Court’s review of Advocate in 2017. The Supreme Court’s
decision in Advocate rejected all three unanimous views of the circuit courts,
which paints a cautionary tale for circuit courts that may try to predict how other
courts might act.
PART II: THE SUPREME COURT RESOLVES THE CIRCUIT SPLIT WITH ADVOCATE
A. Advocate Health Care v. Stapleton
On June 5, 2017, the Supreme Court unanimously sided with the
religiously-affiliated hospital, reversing the judgments of the Third, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits.67 Justice Kagan explained that the use of the word “includes” in
the exemption definition is not literal but rather signals to readers of the statute
that a “different type of plan should receive the same treatments (i.e. an
exemption) as the type described in the old definition.”68 This interpretation of
the statute effectively opened up the church plan exemption to more
organizations than previously thought. Justice Sotomayor concurred to express
why this outcome still troubled her: the silence of the legislative history on the
question before the Court in 2017 and the difference between the church plans
of 1980 when the statute was enacted and those before the Court in 2017.69
The main takeaway from this case is clear: ERISA provides an exemption
for an employee benefit plan maintained by a church affiliated organization
62. Id. at 521–23.
63. Cardoza-Estremera v. Berrios, No. CV 16-2318 (ADC), 2017 WL 3098089, at *3 (D.P.R. July
20, 2017) (quoting Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652, 1664 n.2 (2017)).
64. Rollins v. Dignity Health, 830 F.3d 900, 903–04 (9th Cir. 2016).
65. Id. at 903.
66. Id.
67. Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017).
68. Id. at 1658.
69. Id. at 1663.
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regardless of whether a church affiliated organization also established the plan.
The type of entity—either a church or its affiliate—that established the plan is
irrelevant.70 Yet, there are two questions that Advocate leaves unaddressed. First,
how do church-affiliated organizations that satisfy the “maintained” criterion for
the church plan exemption determine whether they also satisfy the other statutory
requirements for exemption, and is the exemption itself even permissible under
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Second, if the church plan
exemption does apply, what legal obligations does a non-ERISA plan face in lieu
of the standards applicable to an ERISA plan?71
The Court noted in the ruling that it did not address the second requirement
of the law: that an exempt church plan be maintained by an “organization” that
has administration of the plan as its principal purpose. Justice Sotomayor
summarized these concerns in her concurrence:
Other provisions also impact the scope of the ‘church plan’
exemption. Those provisions—including the provisions governing
which organizations qualify as principal purpose organizations
permitted to establish and maintain ‘church plans,’ need also be
construed in line with their text and with a view toward effecting
ERISA’s broad remedial purposes.72
Additionally, the Court made it clear that it was not giving deference to
government analyses of decisions, such as PLRs.73
B. Principal Purpose Requirements
A religiously-controlled medical facility cannot itself administer an exempt
benefit plan for its employees because ERISA requires such a plan to be
administered by an organization whose principal purpose is to administer that
retirement plan. A hospital with a charitable purpose must instead operate
exclusively to further a proper exempt purpose, as defined in I.R.C. § 501, in
order to maintain its tax-exempt status as a charitable organization. Generally,
the promotion of health is considered to be a charitable purpose.74 Both Congress
and the IRS treat § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations as co-partners with the
federal government because such organizations receive tax-deductible charitable
contributions and perform their activities with contributed funds.75 Because all
tax exemptions are a matter of legislative grace, Congress imposes strict
70. Id.
71. Joanne C. Youn & Ronald G. Cluett, Church-Affiliated Organizations Face New Challenges
After Advocate, 29 Tᴀx’ɴ Exᴇᴍᴘᴛꜱ 26, 26 (2017).
72. Advocate, 137 S. Ct. at 1663–64 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 1657, 1663 (majority opinion).
74. ERIKA LUNDER & EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TAX EXEMPT SECTION 501(C)(3)
HOSPITALS: COMMUNITY BENEFIT STANDARD AND SCHEDULE H 2–3 (2008).
75. Internal Revenue Serv., Tax Information for Charitable Organizations, IRS.GOV,
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations (last updated Jan. 17, 2019).
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operating requirements upon qualified organizations.76 The Affordable Care Act
modified these requirements for tax-exempt hospitals; as of 2010, a § 501(c)(3)
hospital must satisfy: community health needs assessment rules, financial
assistance policy rules, charge limitations, and billing and collection rules.77
Two types of organizations qualify for the church-plan exemption:
churches and so-called principal purpose organizations.78 After the enactment of
ERISA, plans maintained by a church-affiliated organization must satisfy
specific statutory requirements in order to claim the church plan exemption.79
The IRS requires that church-related employers provide health plans to their
employees that satisfy the committee requirement under § 414(e)(3)(a); that is,
it must be maintained by an organization whose principal purpose or function is
the administration or funding of the plan and which is controlled by, or associated
with, a church or convention or association of churches.80 Generally, the IRS has
required plan sponsors—i.e. religiously-controlled hospitals—to satisfy this
requirement by appointing a committee whose principal function is the
administration of the plan.81 Yet, the Court in Advocate did not actually
determine whether the hospitals’ internal benefits committees qualified as a
“church-associated organization whose chief purpose or function is to fund or
administer a benefits plan for the employee of either a church or a churchaffiliated nonprofit.”82 Therefore, it is still unclear whether any and all similar
committees and organizations would satisfy the principal purpose requirement.
Because the existing legal authority does not fully address or define these
requirements, further litigation addressing the scope of the ERISA exemption for
plans maintained by church-affiliated organizations is likely, including
arguments concerning its constitutionality, as well as those specific to the
statutory text.83 The Court in Advocate did not address the existence of the letter
rulings, so those rulings addressing the principal purpose requirements do not
76. Reagan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983).
77. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(r)-3 (2018); 26 U.S.C. § 501(r)(4); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(r)–4; 26 U.S.C.
§ 501(r)(5); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(r)-5; 26 U.S.C. § 501(r)(6); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(r)-6.
78. Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 877 F.3d 1213, 1221 (10th Cir. 2017).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(C)(i) (2018) (emphasis added) (“A plan established and maintained . . . by
a church . . . includes a plan maintained by an organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise,
the principal purpose or function of which is the administration or funding of a plan . . . for the employees
of a church . . . if such organization is controlled by or associated with a church.”).
80. DANIEL J. SCHWARTZ, 487 T.M., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS,
PORTFOLIO 487-1ST, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, DETAILED ANALYSIS, A.
NON-ELECTING CHURCH PLANS, BNA.
81. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201739010 (Sept. 29, 2017); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201247023
(Aug. 31, 2012), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201233027 (May 25, 2012), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200813044 (Jan.
2, 2008), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200708090 (Nov. 28, 2006), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200610023 (Dec. 12,
2005)
82. Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652, 1658 n.3 (2017).
83. Joanne C. Youn & Ronald G. Cluett, Church-Affiliated Organizations Face New Challenges
After Advocate, TAX’N EXEMPTS 26, 26 (2017).
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offer authoritative reliance to church-affiliated organization seeking clarity
regarding the status of their organizational structure.84
The “principal purpose” standard is vague and difficult to apply, yet carries
huge implications. Religiously-affiliated hospitals and their affiliated entities
that maintain their retirement plans under the notion that they are included in
ERISA’s church plan exemption may face a rude awakening should the Court
one day interpret this phrase narrowly. These organizations should have some
test that they can rely upon to determine whether the “principal purpose”
standard applies to their activities. One main reason why the Court in Advocate
found the provision at issue to be interpreted widely was to allow organizations
to better understand their own individual status under the law. Previously, the
process of obtaining a PLR for each individual organization was arduous, so this
ruling by the Court was supposed to alleviate that struggle. Yet, that struggle
remains. Religiously-affiliated health organizations often rely heavily on the
ERISA church plan exemption in their everyday administration and therefore
should feel confident that it does indeed qualify for the exemption. The best way
this uncertainty can be solved is through the creation—or recognition—of a
universal definition of “principal purpose” as used in ERISA § 33(C)(i).
PART III: DEVELOPMENTS SINCE ADVOCATE V. STAPLETON AND DEFINING
“PRINCIPAL PURPOSE”
A. Introduction
Since the Supreme Court handed down the opinion in Advocate in the
summer of 2017, district courts have struggled to apply the new guidelines. The
limited and vague guidance from the IRS and the Department of Labor only make
the problem worse. A religiously-affiliated entity will have to take a more
creative approach in its attempt to clarify the statutory standards.
B. Defining “Principal Purpose” Through Case Law Guidance
i. Lown v. Continental Casualty
The Lown test is a fact-sensitive inquiry that may provide a little more
guidance for some church-affiliated organizations than the statutory language of
ERISA, even assuming the other requirements for the church plan exemption can
be satisfied.85 In Lown v. Continental Casualty Company, an employee of Baptist
Health System of South Carolina (the System) asserted that litigation of her
claims under the System’s long-term disability plan was not subject to federal

84. Id. at 27.
85. Id. at 28; Lown v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 238 F.3d 543. 548 (4th Cir. 2001).
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question jurisdiction because the System’s ties to the South Carolina Baptist
Convention exempted the plan from ERISA.86 The Fourth Circuit held that the
exemption did not apply to the System’s plan because the Baptist Convention
did not appoint or approve any System board members and did not provide any
monetary support to the System.87 The court stated that:
[i]n deciding whether an organization shares common bonds and
convictions with a church, three factors bear primary consideration:
(1) whether the religious institution plays any official role in the
governance of the organization; (2) whether the organization receives
assistance from the religious institution; and (3) whether a
denominational requirement exists for any employee or
patient/customer of the organization. 88
Applying these factors, the court found the healthcare organization at issue
did not qualify as a “church plan,” since it had formally disaffiliated from the
Baptist Convention several years before the litigation, and no denomination
requirement remained.89
Applied to the issue at hand, the Lown factors could be helpful in deciding
whether a religiously-affiliated hospital and its designated subcommittee are
“principle purpose” organizations. Yet, as Tenth Circuit argued in Medina v.
Catholic Health Initiatives, these factors are not determinative because they are
more narrow than the statutory definition found in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(c)(iv).90
“[T]o be ‘associated with a church,’ a corporation need only share ‘common
religious bonds and convictions with that church or convention or association of
churches.’”91 Moreover, the statute imposes no denominational requirements,
corporate governance requirements, or funding requirements.92 In contrast, an
organization could meet the statutory definition but satisfy none of the Lown
factors.93 “Satisfying the Lown factors may suffice to establish that an
organization is associated with a church,” but an organization need not satisfy
the Lown factors in order to be associated with a church.94 Therefore, further
analysis is needed.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Lown, 238 F.3d 543.
Id. at 548.
Id.
Id.
Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 877 F.3d 1213, 1224 (10th Cir. 2017).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ii. Cardoza-Estremera v. Berrios
Cardoza-Estremera v. Berrios was one of the first district court opinions
handed down after Advocate that addressed the new Supreme Court guidance.95
In this case, plaintiffs were parochial-school teachers who participated in the
employee pension plan of the Catholic Schools of the Roman Catholic
Archdiocese.96 The complaint alleged that defendant mismanaged plaintiff’s
pension plan. Defendant moved the court to dismiss, arguing that plaintiffs’
pension plan is exempt from ERISA because it is a “church plan” within the
meaning of 29 U.S.C. §1002(33).97 The defendants seemed to think that this
exemption-based argument contests plaintiffs’ standing to sue.98 The District
Court of Puerto Rico denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the
exemption status of the plan doesn’t affect the plaintiffs’ standing or the Court’s
subject matter jurisdiction.99 The court stated that the complaint did state a
facially plausible claim that ERISA covers the plan.100
iii. Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives
In this case, a retirement plan participant brought putative class action
against her employer, a nonprofit organization created to carry out the Roman
Catholic Church’s healing ministry, alleging the plan was not an exempt church
plan under ERISA. The Tenth Circuit simply applied the Supreme Court’s
holding in Advocate, stating that ERISA extends the church plan exemption to
so-called principal purpose organizations. The court explicitly defined a
principal purpose organization as a “church-affiliated organization whose
principal purpose is administering or funding a benefit plan for the employees of
a church or a church-affiliated nonprofit organization.”101
The court went further to find that ERISA § 33(C) imposes a three-step
inquiry for entities seeking to use the church plan exemption for plans maintained
by principal purpose organizations.102 These entities can determine if they are
liable for the church plan exemption by asking the following questions. First, is

95. Cardoza-Estremera v. Berrios, No. 16-2318 (ADC), 2017 WL 3098098, at *1 (D.P.R. July 20,
2017).
96. Id.
97. Id. Defendants urged that the plan is a church plan because it “was established by the church to
cover only [parochial-school] employees,” those parochial schools “are an integral part of the Catholic
Church,” and the plan is maintained by the schools’ Superintendent “to the extent [she] does not delegate
totally or partially such control to a Retirement Committee,” and the Superintendence “is an office of the
Archdiocese,” which is exempt from federal taxes. The court found that these assertions, alone, were not
enough to prove the pension plan was an exempt church plan. Id. at *7.
98. Id. at *3..
99. Id. at *2.
100. Id. at *5.
101. Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 877 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2017).
102. Id. at 1222.
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the entity a tax-exempt non-profit organization associated with a church? If so,
second, is the entity’s retirement plan maintained by a principal purpose
organization? That is, is the plan maintained by an organization whose principal
purpose is administrating or funding a retirement plan for entity employees?
Then, if so, is that principal purpose organization itself associated with a
church?103
In Medina, the Court ultimately found in favor of the nonprofit
organization. Roman Catholic canon law provides that, “public juridic persons
need civil-law counterparts—normally nonprofit corporations—in order to
transact civil-law business, such as holding title to property.”104 As a public
juridic person organized under canon law, the Catholic Church regards Catholic
Healthcare Foundation as an official part of the Catholic Church, so the court
agrees that the Catholic Health Initiatives, its civil law counterpart, is “associated
with” a church.105
iv. A Combination Approach of Medina plus Lown
While the Medina test only has binding force over the Tenth Circuit, the
thoroughness of the analysis will likely have persuasive force in other courts in
the future; it could be combined with the Lown factors and then applied
nationwide as a standard test in determining if an organization is principally
purposed. Here, each step of the test will be deconstructed further to demonstrate
how district and circuit courts could apply this inquiry.
Step one asks if the entity is a tax-exempt non-profit organization
associated with a church.106 It’s not enough for an entity to be established by a
religious entity; it must currently maintain an association.107 It should be clear
according to an entity’s charter whether it is a non-profit organization; the only
issue that could arise is regarding the definition of “association.”108 In analyzing
this first prong, courts should turn to the Lown factors, where an institution is
“associated with” a church when: (1) the church plays an official role in the
governance of the organization, (2) the organization received assistance from the
religious institution, or (3) a denominational requirement exists for any
employee, patient, or customer of the organization.109 This inquiry is fact-based
and any entity should be able to determine for itself whether these terms are met.
Should the entity meet at least one element of step one, the inquiry moves
forward to the Medina step two.
103.
104.
105.
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107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id. at 1222–23.
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Lown v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 238 F.3d 543, 548 (4th Cir. 2001).
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The second step considers whether the entity’s retirement plan is
maintained by an organization whose principal purpose is administering or
funding a retirement plan for entity employees.110 The Tenth Circuit in Medina
reasoned that the term “maintain,” as used in this context, must mean “to keep in
a state of validity.”111 In some cases, the umbrella religiously-affiliated entity
maintains retirement plans for its own employees, but in most cases this
responsibility is outsourced to another organization. This separation allows
medical facilities to focus on their medical duties, while allowing another
organization to focus principally on employee benefits. In this case, this other
organization must care for the plan for purposes of “operational productivity.”112
In Medina, for example, the plan was maintained by an internal plan
subcommittee, which was considered to be an alter ego; because it provided
benefits to employees of a religious nonprofit organization, the Tenth Circuit
found it was associated with a church.113
The third part of the test asks whether the principal purpose organization
maintaining the plan is itself associated with a church.114 This is the main issue
presented. At first glance, this prong seems to be repetitive of part two of the test,
defining a “principal purpose” organization as one that has a “principal purpose,”
but this part looks further than the status of the entity seeking the exemption. Not
only does the entity itself have to be associated with a church, but its retirement
plan must also be “maintained” by a principle purpose organization.115 For
example, in Advocate, the religiously-affiliated hospital was clearly a principal
purpose organization, but the Court did not decide whether the hospital’s
subcommittee that managed the retirement plans was also a principal purpose
organization.116 In Medina, this question was easily solved in the affirmative
because the subcommittee that managed the plan was completely controlled by
the larger entity.117 “As a matter of logic,” the court stated, “a subdivision wholly
encompassed by a larger entity shares that entity’s affiliations.”118 This court
expressly declined to address the same issue that Advocate left unanswered:
whether the medical facility’s internal benefit committee qualified as a “principal
purpose organization.”119 Besides this limited guidance, the scope of a “principal

110.
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112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1225 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1362 (2002)).
Id. at 1226 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1039 (9th ed. 2009)).
Id. at 1219.
Id. at 1222.
Id.
Id. at 1221 (citing Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017)).
Id. at 1226–27.
Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1221.
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purpose organization” remains undefined.120 Therefore, entities should look
beyond the case law to try to define “principal purpose.”
D. Administrative Guidance on Defining “Principal Purpose” in ERISA Cases
Relying on the language in ERISA’s church plan exemption, the
Department of Labor and IRS have repeatedly recognized exemptions for
church-affiliated schools and hospitals plans when the benefits committee
administering the plans were themselves controlled by a church. However, this
analysis seems circular in nature by defining church plans as those already
established as eligible for church plans. If the only function of a hospital’s
internal benefits committee is to maintain the employee benefit plan, then clearly
that organization is principally purposed. Yet, if the same committee took on
additional roles, such as ones typically performed by an in-house human
resources department, it is unclear whether it would maintain that status.
A plan will qualify as a church plan only if it is first maintained by an
organization and controlled by or associated with a church whose principal
purpose or function is to administer the plan.121 The IRS’s general position,
reflected in several PLRs, is a principally purposed organization’s retirement
sub-committee that administers the plan as its sole purpose is also considered a
principal purpose organization.122 However, when such a committee has other
purposes, the standard becomes muddied.
Most of the administrative guidance addressing ERISA § 3(33) gives little
insight into the reasoning behind the IRS and the Department of Labor’s
decisions on whether or not an organization is principally purposed. In countless
PLRs, the IRS seems to simply accept the requesting party’s assertion that its
organization is principally purposed.123 Many of these reports include a
statement similar to this: because the organization’s principal purpose is to
administer the employee retirement plan, it is a “principal purpose”
organization.124 This circular reasoning provided by the IRS is far from

120. Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652, n.3 (2017); Medina v. Catholic
Health Initiatives, 877 F. 3d 1213, 1228 (10th Cir. 2017).
121. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,007 (July 1, 1983).
122. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8936052 (June 13, 1989); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9029039 (Apr. 23,
1990); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9322032 (Mar. 9, 1993); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9617047 (Jan. 31, 1996); I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9619073 (Feb. 13, 1996); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200307096 (Nov. 22, 2002).
123. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-36-052 (June 13, 1989); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-38-071 (June
28, 1991); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-17-047 (Jan. 31, 1996); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-19-073 (Feb. 13, 1996);
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2014-15-015 (Jan. 13, 2014); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2015-05-051 (Nov. 3, 2014).
124. See, e.g. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9041004 (June 25, 1990); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9138071 (June 28,
1991); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9537034 (June 23, 1995); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9702035 (Oct. 16, 1996); I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9705021 (Nov. 4, 1996); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200148055 (July 16, 2001); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 200207027 (Nov. 19, 2001); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200331010 (May 9, 2003); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
200418050 (Feb. 06, 2004); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201222052 (Mar. 7, 2012); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.

2019]

THE “PRINCIPAL PURPOSE” DRIVEN LIFE

241

enlightening.125 Religiously-affiliated hospitals could read a hundred PLRs
based on this statutory provision126 and still fail to understand whether its own
employee benefit committees comply.
The only rare guidance that religiously-affiliated hospital and their
employee benefit committees have to rely on are a few administrative guidance
documents issued prior to Advocate. When at least 80% of the employee benefit
committee meetings include discussion of administration or funding of the Plan,
the Department of Labor found that it met the principal purpose test.127 When the
benefits committee’s principal overall function is to shape the policy and direct
the operations of the plan and other retirement and welfare benefit plans
maintained by the organization, the IRS found that it met the principal purpose
test.128 Yet, it is not necessary for the individuals who are officers of a principal
purpose organization, such a religiously-controlled hospital, to do so on a fulltime basis or to have their role with the organization as their principal activity or
responsibility.129 When a benefits plan committee’s sole responsibility was
expanded to include provision of the other benefits for lay employees of the
hospital, it still qualified as a “church plan.”130 Lastly, a committee still retained
its principal purpose status despite having expanded duties that included the
power: “to adopt bylaws and to make and enforce rules and regulations for
administration of Plan X, to determine all questions of eligibility for benefits,
duration of employment, computation of benefits and value of benefits, to
employ necessary advisors, to maintain adequate records and file appropriate
government filings . . .”131 Despite the magnitude of private letter rulings issued
directly addressing this ERISA provision, a religiously-affiliated medical facility
and its subcommittees still have little guidance on which to proceed. Therefore,
it may look elsewhere to try to define clear guidelines around the term “principal
purpose.”

201233027 (May 25, 2012); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201415015 (Jan. 13, 2014); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
201505051 (Nov. 3, 2014).
125. Due to the confidential nature of private letter rulings, there is only so many background facts
that the IRS is willing to include in a PLR. Therefore, it’s unclear to the general public whether the
conclusions are based on solid circumstantial facts or if the IRS is simply trusting a hospital’s assertion
that its committee is principal purpose. One would hope that the IRS is confident that a particular
organization is principle purpose before it issues a PLR on that exact matter, but the average person doesn’t
have any way to double check the IRS’s conclusions.
126. This is an avenue that the author does not recommend, coming from her personal experience.
127. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Advisory Opinion Letter 93-01A (Jan. 6, 1993).
128. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9742038 (July 25, 1997).
129. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,007 (July 1, 1983).
130. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Advisory Opinion No. 86-19A (Aug. 22, 1986) (explaining that the
responsibility was expanded namely to hospitalization benefits, life insurance and accidental death and
dismemberment benefits, long term disability, dental benefits, vision benefits, and opportunities for HMO
membership).
131. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9444036 (Aug. 8, 1994).
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E. Administrative Guidance on Defining “Principal Purpose” as Used in NonERISA Cases
As almost a last resort, an entity seeking to determine if it meets the
requirements of ERISA § 3(33) may look to other administrative guidelines
issued in contexts outside the realm of ERISA that define the terms “principal
purpose.” For example, a hospital is considered to be “charitable”132 when its
“principal purpose and function” is the provision of medical and hospital care.133
An educational organization’s “principal purpose and function” is the
presentation of formal education in the instructive sense when it regularly
maintains a faculty and a curriculum and regularly enrolled body of pupils or
students in attendance at the place where its educational activities are regularly
carried on.134 A rehabilitation institution or an out-patient clinic may qualify as
a hospital if its “principal purpose or functions” is the provision of hospital or
medical care.135 Where the principal purpose and functions of an organization
are the maintenance of a museum and library and other facilities for research,
with secondary activities in furtherance of the organization’s graduate and postgraduate educational aims, the organization does not constitute an educational
organization.136 An organization whose activities have the aspects of a church or
association of churches, an educational organization, and a hospital, but whose
principal purposes or functions are not those of a church or association of
churches, or an educational organization, or a hospital, does not qualify under
any of the classes of “charitable” organizations set forth in IRC §
170(b)(1)(A).137
F. An Amalgam of Approaches
Since not one proposed approach is fool proof, religiously-affiliated
hospital are likely to apply some or all of these approaches in their attempt to
define their own employee benefits committee as principal purpose. At the end
of the day, though, the Advocate ruling provides little guidance for the typical
religiously-affiliated hospital. It’s time for Congress to take action and clearly
define the requirements for ERISA’s church plan exemption. The stakes are too
high for the standard to be this muddy.

132. Internal Revenue Serv., Charitable Hospitals-General Requirements for Tax Exemption Under
Section 501(c)(3), IRS.GOV, (https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-hospitals-generalrequirements-for-tax-exemption-under-section-501c3 (last updated Nov. 7, 2018).
133. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9215047 (Jan. 14, 1992).
134. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5702044380A (Feb. 4, 1957).
135. 26 C.F.R. § 1.170-2(a)(4) (2018).
136. I.R.S. Rev. Rul. 58-433, 1958-2 C.B. 102.
137. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5507064520A (July 6, 1955).
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CONCLUSION
After Advocate v. Stapleton, the Supreme Court seemed to leave as many
questions unanswered as answered. Religiously-affiliated hospitals and their
employee benefit committees remain in a tough spot where they must make a
best guess as to whether to blindly rely on the church plan exemption or go
through the arduous private letter rulings process to know for sure. Because so
much is on the line—especially all their employees’ long term retirement
accounts—hospitals are more likely to take the latter approach. While large
hospitals may be able to afford this extra cost, smaller religiously-controlled
entities like private schools and nursing homes will likely face more challenges.
So in the long run, Advocate doesn’t actually save these church-affiliated entities
any time or money. Without a clear answer, the men and women who choose to
work at a non-profit medical facility have to take the risk that their pension plans
could disappear should the entity ever cease to exist. It’s imperative that the
Court address this issue and clearly decide it once and for all.

